Environmental policy and the properties of Environmental damages by Zehaie, Ficre
Environmental Policy and the Properties of
Environmental Damages
Applications to economic growth and international
environmental problems
Ficre Zehaie
Faculty of Natural Resources and Agricultural Sciences
Department of Economics,
Uppsala
Doctoral Thesis
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences
Uppsala 2005Acta Universitatis Agriculturae Sueciae
2005:87
ISSN, 1652-6880
ISBN, 91-576-6986-4
c ￿ 2005 Ficre Zehaie, Uppsala
Tryck: SLU Service/Repro, Uppsala 2005To my sister Eru because I have missed her all these years.
To my brother Iyob because I miss him and because he stood up for his beliefs
no matter what the cost.Abstract
FicreZehaie. EnvironmentalPolicyandthePropertiesofEnvironmentalDamages—
Applications to economic growth and international environmental problems. Doc-
toral Thesis.
ISSN, 1652-6880, ISBN, 91-576-6986-4.
This thesis focus on three properties of environmental damages: variation across
individuals, across sectors and geographical variation. The thesis consists of ﬁve
articles, two are on long term growth and the environment, two are on international
environmental problems and one is on growth and international environmental prob-
lems.
In Article I it is shown that under the assumption that pollution is a public bad,
productivity of pollution has no effect on steady state growth rate. However, if the
reach of pollution is limited then pollution is not purely public in character and the
productivity of pollution has a positive impact on growth. In Article V population
growth’s positive and negative effects on pollution are examined.
In Article II the strategic aspect of self-protective activities to moderate envi-
ronmental damages is analyzed. Self-protection is deﬁned as decreasing own en-
vironmental damages without changing the level of pollution. Agents can through
self-protection make strategic gains by decreasing their cost of abatement and still
enjoy high level environmental quality as other agents are induced to increase their
abetment. These gains are greatest when agents cooperate on abatement because
cooperation leaves more room for strategic behavior to self-protection.
In Article III environmental policy of open countries trading polluting goods and
polluted eco-services is investigated. Large economies choose strict or lax environ-
mental policies depending on the relative value of eco-services and how this value
changes due to changes in environmental policy. For small regional environmen-
tal problems where prices are exogenous, it is shown that a country’s response to
changes of the world price depend on the relative productivity of emissions within
the region and the response of other countries.
In Article IV we look at a problem when countries concerned with the envi-
ronment unilaterally abate in foreign countries because of low technological pro-
ductivity levels in the latter countries and asymmetries in environmental damages.
Sweden, ﬁnancing sewage treatment plants in the baltic region to moderate eutroph-
ication of the Baltic Sea, may be such an example.
Key words: Environmental damages, environmental policy, characteristics of bads,
economic growth, population growth, strategic behaviors, self-protection, trade and
the environment, transboundary pollution.
Author’saddress: Department ofEconomics, SLUBox 7013, 750 07 Uppsala, Swe-
den.Preface
I developed a particular interest in environmental economics during my undergradu-
ate studies in the ﬁrst half of the 90’s thanks to a dynamic group working in that ﬁeld
at the Department of Economics at SLU. Years later, when Ing-Marie Green gave
me the opportunity to start the PhD programme in economics with specialization on
environmental issues, I never hesitated.
I am very grateful to my supervisors. Some months ago when research seemed
meaningless and I was slowing down with my work Clas Eriksson asked me "Would
it make any difference if I am tougher on you?". At that time I think those words
were among the few that could have reached me. That is typical of Clas, he could
always read me. He gave me the necessary input when I needed it. Through our col-
laboration on the ﬁrst article he gave me inspiration and introduced me to academic
writing. He also gave me the freedom to develop my own ideas while still keeping a
great interest in my work. He quickly discovered weakness in my drafts and always
gave me valuable advice and suggestions. Thank you Clas! I would also like to
thank Ing-Marie Gren for believing in me and giving me the opportunity to start my
PhD. Throughout, my graduated studies Ing-Marie has been a great support to me
and she has continuously encouraged me. I am particularly grateful for her, as well
as other’s colleagues, moral support one year ago in a difﬁcult time of my life.
Thanks to the group of graduated students at The Department of Economics at
SLU for making my time as a Ph D student much more enjoyable. I am particularly
indebted to Rob Hart. As a keen observer, Rob, has been a great resource to me. His
comments are always right on target and have improved my thinking and writing.
Functioning as an English dictionary, introducing and helping me with the computer
package Latex he has saved me lots of time. Special thanks also to Ruben Hoffman,
Mitesh Kataria, Dennis Collentine and Magnus Hennlock from whom I have gained
a great deal through discussions and suggestions. Thanks also to Erik Fahlbeck,
Peter Frykblom, Richard Furguson who, along with those already mentioned and
many other graduated students, with interest have participated in one or more of my
seminars at the department. Thanks, to Tomas Sjögren for valuable comments at my
ﬁnal seminar and to Christina Brundin for an excellent library service.
There also other people that deserve my gratitude. My ﬁrst year in Uppsala I
arranged a room to rent but was later refused the room because as the landlord ex-
pressed it ‘I have to give priority to Swedish students’. Having no where to stay
Yared Tekeste, Adiam and their daughter Malaika invited me to stay in their apart-
ment and gave me the opportunity to start my academic carrier in their a warm and
secure home. Thank you! Early in my undergraduate studies I got to know a group
of students starting up an organization that later took the name of SUG (Studenter
utan Gränser). Being part of this group made my academic life easier and full of
interesting discussions and laughter. Thank you to all SUG people, and especially
(in a rough order of appearance!) to Samuel Habteab, Rene Léon, Alicia Barczyk,
Nesrin Aslan, Roland Madarász, Valenka Molina Vidal, Christine Schnabel, Josef
el Mahdi, Cristoffer Lindgren, Nadine Gaib, Elin Asplund and Daniel Lindvall.
Among my fellow country men I often heard that ‘a good freedom ﬁghter build-
ing a nation must start by building up his family’. In that case the best freedom
ﬁghter I know is my mother. Knowing her, I have many times asked myself howmuch love a heart can contain. She gives love to everybody even though her love is
not returned. Her love and teaching to always do good no matter what others do is
fundamental to me as it helps me to face each day in a positive manner. Thanks also
to my brother Ghedlom that better than anyone of her children learned to be gen-
erous with his love and whatever he owns. My admiration goes also to my brother
Iyob who was way ahead of us in any thinking that he did. He stood up for his be-
liefs against authorities, norms and traditions no matter what the cost. His curiosity
and critical analysis would have made him a great researcher but he chose to deal
with real problems rather than academic abstractions. Finally, I am grateful to my
soul mate, my wife Malin. No words can express how much I owe her. Her love
has constantly been feeding me with energy and helped me to overcome that which
I believed was not possible to overcome. The fruit of our love is our son Iyob whom
in these last months has been the source of so much joy, that I ﬁnd it impossible
to convey. His birth was a turning point in my life and I’m not sure that this PhD
would have been ﬁnished if he had not been with me these last months of writing.
This thesis consists of ﬁve papers where the main theme is that the economic dam-
ages of pollution are more complicated than is often assumed in the literature. This
idea later crystalized in the the title of this thesis. I am not sure this title ﬁts all the
articles but I found it to be the most appropriate of all the alternative that I could
think of.
Ficre Zehaie,
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Articles I–V1 Introduction
The process of environmentally caused economic damages—or simply environmen-
tal damages—may be described as follows: Human activities generate emissions
polluting the environment which then lands to economic damages. In the literature
there is a tendency to overlook the difference between pollution of the environment
and its economic consequences. To some extent this may be semantics as most en-
vironmental economist when they use the term pollution in fact mean its economic
consequences. However, there seems to be more to it. In the theoretical literature on
environmental economics it is often assumed that pollution is a public bad (or that
environmental quality is a public good) and therefore affects all individuals.1 This
assumption is often interpreted as if all individuals are equally affected. Alterna-
tively, the literature disregards variations in pollution. Thus, it may be problematic
to use pollution as synonymous with the damages it causes. In reality environmental
damages often varies across geographical areas, individuals or sectors of the econ-
omy even when pollution is public. For instance, global warming is predicted to
increase sea water level and the damages upon individuals or ﬁrms vary depending
on the distance to the sea and the altitude of the area where they are situated. Fur-
thermore, the better the local infrastructure the lower the damages. In the case of
ozone depleting chemicals, it is acknowledged that the ozone holes occur primar-
ily in cold areas and therefore damages vary depending on where individuals live
relative to the holes. Similarly, damages due to car emissions depend on individ-
ual’s positions relative to heavily trafﬁcked areas. In the two last cases individuals
can protect themselves by solar blocks or air masks, both of which inﬂuence the
variation across individuals. It is therefore reasonable to think that agents’ choices
between environmental quality and consumption goods are related to these varia-
tions, which in this thesis are described as properties of environmental damages.
Most models make the common assumption that pollution is a public bad and ig-
nore these variations. The main theme of this thesis is a more careful treatment of
environmental damages.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that the properties of environmental dam-
ages need to be considered in order to efﬁciently design environmental policies.
This is applied to two areas: economic growth and international environmental eco-
nomics. Articles I and V consider how the reach of damages across individuals
may affect long term economic choices. Article II examines agents’ strategic be-
havior when they can decrease damages to their own beneﬁt. Article III studies
open economies’ optimal behavior when damages vary across sectors that produce
traded goods. Finally, Article IV deals with both economic growth and international
environmental problems when damages vary across geographical areas.
First the properties of environmental damages considered in this thesis are pre-
sented, followed by a summery of each of the ﬁve articles included in the thesis are
1In this thesis we sometime use the terms individuals, ﬁrms and countries and sometimes the more
general term agents to refer to any of the three terms.
13summarized. In the ﬁnal section conclusions are presented.
2 Environmental Damages
To capture some conceptual similarities of environmental damages it is necessary
to disregard from at least some of its complexities. In environmental economics it
is common to disregard from the many ways in which environmental damages may
affect humans. In particular, this is often the case in the theoretical literature on
growth and pollution (see for instance Keeler et al. (1972), Brock (1977), Tahvo-
nen and Kuuluvainen (1993) and Bovenberg and Smulders (1995)) and the theoret-
ical literature on international environmental problems(see for instance Markusen
(1975), Copeland and Taylor (1990), Hoel (1992) and Barrett (1994)). However,
in this thesis it is argued that the ﬁnal impact of pollution on human welfare may
show to have greater variations than is often acknowledged and affects environmen-
tal policy. In the following sections the different properties (types of variation) of
environmental damages that are examined in this thesis are discussed.
2.1 Variation Across Individuals
In this thesis two types of variations across individuals are examined. In Article I
variation across individuals occurs because the reach of pollution is limited and in
Article II because agents can take self-protective measures to moderate damages.
If pollutants are not purely public the damages across individual will vary be-
cause one agents exposure to pollution will leave less pollution for other individ-
uals. The crucial assumption is that pollutants are rival. A well known example
of a private bad is a bag of garbage thrown into a neighbor’s garden. An example
of something between a public and private bad may be illustrated by the following
case. If a a good available in the market contains some chemicals or dangerous mi-
cro organisms there is a given probability that a consumer will be affected. For each
consumer that is affected, and given that the affected consumer does not himself
affect other consumers, the probability that other consumers are affected decreases.
Thus consumers are rivals in the bad but they are not fully rivals as the ’consump-
tion’ of the bad of one individual just decreases the probability that other consumers
will be affected.
Furthermore, environmental damages across agents may vary because agents
can take self-protective measures to moderate damages for given levels of pollu-
tion. For example, if global warming, as predicted, increases the frequency of bad
weather, then countries can moderate damages through improvements in weather
forecasting, monitoring systems and improvements in infrastructures. An other ex-
ample of self-protection is individuals protecting themselves from hazardous solar
rays by using solar blocks or clothing. Therefore the level of self-protection that
each agent chooses will to some extent determine the level of damages harming the
agent. Since the possibility of self-protection may differ among agents, for instance
as a result of differences in income and technological levels, one should expect that
environmental damages vary across individuals.
142.2 Variation Across Sectors
Some sectors of the economy are more likely to suffer from environmental damage
than others. For example, emissions that may result in ecosystem degradation, re-
duces the ﬂow of eco-services. Meanwhile, production in other sectors, given the
level of technology, may be positively related to emission levels.
From a consumer’s point of view degradation of the environment is often con-
sidered to be a public bad. However, from a producer’s point of view, allowing
higher emission levels may beneﬁt production in some sectors while harming other
sectors. Although this is well known in the literature most analyses of international
environmental economics ignore such variations across sectors.
If environmental policy affects sectors of the economy in different ways, it will
also affect the structures of the economies. Since the structure of an economy is
closely connected to trade, it is interesting to investigate environmental policy when
environmental damages vary across sectors in open economies.
2.3 Variation Across Regions
Environmental damages can vary across regions and this may be independent of
where the sources of emissions are located. The extent to which emissions cause
subsequent damages in a region depends upon factors such as its geographical loca-
tion and the the ecology and the meteorology prevailing in the area. These factors
determine the concentrations of emissions across a given region.
This is illustrated by the problem of eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. The Baltic
Sea is bordered by nine countries: Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland,
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Russia. Sweden and Finland have much longer costs
to the Baltic sea than the other countries and a higher proportions of their popula-
tions living around the costs. Furthermore, the highly populated areas in Sweden
and Finland are in the archipelagos which are coastal regions with limited water
exchange. Thus nutrient runoff in these areas is primarily local and only a smaller
amount is transported off to the sea. On the other hand, open coasts such as those of
Latvia and Poland, with high water exchange, are likely to cause a situation where
nutrient losses from these countries lead to relatively low local pollution and con-
versely high transport to the sea proper. Thus nutrient loads to the Baltic Sea seem
to have asymmetric characteristics.
It seems that eutrophication of the Baltic Sea is a concern primarily of Sweden
and Finland. This is partly because a greater proportion of the population in these
two countries lives around the costs and partly because asymmetries in the loads of
nutrient tend to give higher environmental damage in the densely populated coastal
areas of these two countries. Thus the average citizen of these countries is probably
more concerned about eutrophication than the average citizen in the other countries.
153 Article I—Population Density, Pollution and
Growth
In the theoretical literature of economic growth it is standard to assume that degra-
dation of environmental quality has public bad characteristics, which is often in-
terpreted as if every unit of pollution harms the entire population of the economy.2
However, as we argue in the previous section, pollution may affect only a propor-
tion of the population and the extent of exposure may be less than the aggregate
pollution generated in the economy. This implies that the reach of pollution may be
limited. In this paper we therefore investigate the conditions for sustainable growth
when we take into consideration that the reach of pollution is limited. Sustainable
growth is deﬁned as a situation with per capita consumption growth and declining
pollution. Allowing the characters of pollution to vary between the two extremes
cases of a private bad and a public bad, population density emerges as an interesting
factor for sustainable growth.
We introduce the concept of perceived pollution to capture that each individual’s
exposure to pollution is less than the total pollution produced in the economy. We
deﬁne perceived pollution as aggregated pollution deﬂated with the size of popu-
lation, weighted to account for the characteristics of pollution and the population
density. The more private pollution is the greater the weight of population as deﬂa-
tor and the more will pollution be divided among the population. The more public
pollution is the less is the weight of population size as deﬂator and the more will
pollution be spread among the population. Therefore the characteristics of aggre-
gate pollution is related to population density. This relation is introduced through
the elasticity of perceived pollution with respect to population density (EPD). The
more responsive perceived pollution is to population density (i.e. the higher the
EPD), the lower is the weight of population in deﬂating aggregate pollution and the
more public is pollution.
We assume that there is a representative dynasty that maximizes utility and dis-
regard from generational conﬂicts. We calculate optimal long term growth rates
for two types of models: the traditional exogenous growth model and a semi-
endogenous growth model. Consumers face a trade-off between, consumption and
pollution. However, as opposed to the earlier literature, consumers pollution is less
than aggregate pollution and is introduced in the model as perceived pollution. Fol-
lowing, Brock (1977), pollution is an input in the production function along with
capital and labor. We assume that pollution is a ﬂow pollution to hold the model
simple. As Stokey (1998) has showed, assuming stock pollution will not change the
results signiﬁcantly, at least in the long term.
In the exogenous growth model the condition for sustainable growth can be de-
scribedasaracebetweenexogenoustechnologicalchangeandthedragoneconomic
growth from the additional pollution resulting from a growing population. A large
EPD—corresponding to higher responsiveness of perceived pollution to population
2See for example Keeler et al. (1972), Brock (1977), Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1993), Bovenberg
and Smulders (1995), Michel and Rotillon (1995), Smulders and Gradus (1996), Stokey (1998) and
Schou (2000).
16density—reinforces the drag that pollution puts on economic growth. In this case
society puts more resources into the environmental sector. A small EPD moder-
ates the economic drag of population growth and corresponds to a situation where
society puts less resources in the environmental sector.
In the semi-endogenous model technological change is determined within the
model and is therefore an endogenous variable, but population growth is still exoge-
nous. Population growth increases the supply of labor force in the economy and as
such is the driving force for growth in a semi-endogenous model. Furthermore, low
population density decreases the reach of pollution and thereby individuals’ per-
ceived pollution. Consequently, pollution contributes less to jeopardize sustainable
growth. This is reversed if the reach of pollution is high. Then perceived pollution is
high and pollution implies a stronger threat to sustainable growth. The more densely
an area is populated the more difﬁcult it is to achieve sustainable growth.
To summarize: the more public pollution is and the greater population density
is the more difﬁcult it is to achieve sustainable growth.
4 ArticleII—TheStrategicRoleofSelf-protection.
In this paper self-protection from adverse environmental effects is examined as an
alternative strategy to abatement. Self-protection decreases own damages for given
levels of the activities generating the public bad while abatement decreases the ac-
tivities generating public bads to reduce damages. Agents can therefore substitute
an action that has private good characteristics (self-protection) for an action that
has public good characteristics (abatement). It is important to understand strate-
gic games of this kind as sometimes it may be difﬁcult to solve public bad prob-
lems through abatement. For example, interventional environmental agreements on
abatement need to be self-enforcing and it may difﬁcult to sustain efﬁcient levels of
abatement. Therefore, protection may be an alternative option against pollution. In
fact, protective action are considered as a possible strategy to meet global warming,
see for instance IPCC (2001).
The existing literature on self-protection focuses on uncertainty (Ehrlich and
Becker,1972;DionneandEeckhoudt,1985;LewisandNickerson,1989;Immordino,
2003). Shogren and Crocker (1991) study how self-protection transfers or dilutes
the public bad to other agents. Individuals’ expenditures on self-protection has
also been used to approximate the market value of environmental quality (Murdoch
and Thayer, 1990; Baumol and Oates, 1988). Mendelsohn (2000) considers self-
protection as the only instrument against global warming and ﬁnds the common re-
sult that government interventions tend to give non-optimal levels of self-protection
and therefore these intervention are not cost efﬁcient. Despite the obvious interrela-
tion between abatement and protective activities there are no studies that investigate
this interrelation except for Kane and Shogren (2000). They consider protective
activities as an alternative policy to abatement and derive the optimality conditions
under uncertainty and investigate how changes in risks change policy choices of
17abatement and protection. As opposed to this paper, however, they do not analyze
strategic issues.
The level of self-protection affects agents’ vulnerability to pollution and thereby
how much they abate. Since abatement is public, each agent’s abatement level
affects abatement levels of all other agents. Therefore an agent’s choice of self-
protection will affect his own as well as other agents’ share of total abatement. Fol-
lowing the literature on investment as a strategic variable in the provision of public
goods3, a two-stage two-agents model, where agents in the ﬁrst stage of the game
choose the level of self-protection and in the second-stage they choose the level of
abatement, is set up. In each stage agents maximize utility given a budget constraint.
In the ﬁrst stage income can be consumed or used for self-protection, while in the
second stage it can be consumed or used for abatement. There may be three inter-
esting scenarios to investigate. The ﬁrst scenario is the noncooperative case when
agent do not cooperate in any stage. The second scenario is the semi-cooperative
case when agents cooperate in the second stage of the game on abatement but not in
the ﬁrst stage on self-protection. The third scenario is the full-cooperative scenario
when countries cooperate in both stages.
In all scenarios, agents’ choices of abatement and self-protection are determined
by the relative sizes of their marginal costs. However, the strategic aspects of the
problem twist the relative attractiveness of self-protection over abatement. For the
non-cooperative and semi-cooperative scenarios it is shown that self-protection is
substituted for abatement. Self-protection in addition to the direct beneﬁt of protect-
ing from damages, gives strategic advantages, which increases agents’ incentives to
use self-protection. Higher self-protection reduces own damages for a given level
of abatement and thereby decreases own demand for abatement. Consequently, an
agent that has taken self-protective measures decreases her share of abatement level
and other agents respond by increasing their share of total abatement. Since abate-
ment beneﬁts all agents but has private costs an agent by her choice of the level of
self-protection transfers more costs of abatement over to other agents.
The semi-cooperative scenario is an interesting case because it corresponds to
the most common cases of regulation on environmental issues. Policy maker of-
ten regulate abatements or emissions levels but very little attention, if any, is given
to self-protective activities. This in line with conventional economic theory where
regulations on pubic goods may be Pareto improving while regulation on private
goods in not. However, when self-protection is a substitute for abatement this not
to be case. The reason is that agents can still free ride as they can affect the coop-
erative levels of abatements through the use of self-protection to their own beneﬁts.
Within a country it means that individuals can manipulate the social planner’s so-
lution such that the share of abatement they need to contribute with is decreased
and that of the other individual is increased. In international environmental prob-
lems it means that countries can affect cooperative or bargaining outcomes such
that the own contribution to abatement is decreased and that of the other countries
is increased. Furthermore, it is shown that the greatest strategic advantages are to
3See for instance Copeland and Taylor (1990); Buchholtz and Konrad (1994); Stranlund (1996) and
Aggarwal and Narayan (2004).
18be found in the semi-cooperative scenario. The reason is that the levels of abate-
ment when countries cooperate are higher as each country takes into consideration
the positive externality of abatement. Thus, in addition to the strategic gains in the
noncooperative case, self-protection gives an agent further strategic gains from the
additional abatements due to cooperation.
Finally, the full cooperative scenario is investigated and it is shown that the level
of self-protection is the lowest compared to the other two scenarios. The social
planner in the full cooperation case is less willing to substitute self-protection for
abatement because her opportunity cost of self-protection is the beneﬁts abatement
gives to all agents. This is to be compared to the opportunity cost of self protection
for atomic agents which is only their own beneﬁt of abatement.
Assuming that marginal cost of self-protection is negatively related to technol-
ogy, countries with high technology of self-protection can easily lower own share of
abatements and induce other countries to increase their shares of abatements. Thus
when we consider self-protection in the non-cooperative and semi-cooperative sce-
narios technologically less advanced countries’ share of abatement increases and
that of high income countries is decreased. Note also that this result is strongest in
the semi-cooperative case, which is the scenario that best describes the situation of
most international environmental problems. This is interesting because the debate
about international environmental problems often has a starting point where low in-
come countries, corresponding to technologically less advanced countries, have low
environmental concerns. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol is designed such that the
global warming is primarily a responsibility of high income countries. However,
as long as self-protective activities are not included in the protocol, the interest of
high income countries may be limited. This may be one of the reasons why the
agreed levels of GHG-reduction, already at early stage process of the protocol, were
considered too small to stop global warming. This was for instance pointed out by
Wigley (1998).
Until now very little attention has been directed towards self-protection in en-
vironmental issues. Earlier studies on self-protection, with focus on uncertainty,
concludedthatthereislittlesupporttoex-anteinvestmentsinself-protection.4 How-
ever, in this paper it is shown that strategic aspects of environmental problems give
reasons for ex-ante investments in self-protection when agents do not cooperate as
well as when they cooperate on abatement.
5 Article III—Environmental Policy in Open
Economies.
This paper examines international environmental problems when the use of envi-
ronmental services are rival and are traded on the world market. It is found that
environmental policy is crucially dependent on the relative market value of envi-
ronmental services. Most of the literature investigating environmental policy in
4See Ehrlich and Becker (1972); Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985); Lewis and Nickerson (1989) and
Immordino (2003)
19open economies model environmental problems as a general disutility to society.
In the model used here, emissions result in ecosystem degradation (or a loss of
biodiversity), which has an impact on the ﬂow of ecosystem services, henceforth
eco-services. Consequently, sectors of the economy in which production is closely
connected to these eco-services will be harmed. These sectors may be agriculture,
tourism, hydropower or sectors which harvest biological stocks such as timber and
ﬁsh. The economic losses that may occur in these sectors are not public, because the
output is rival in consumption. Thus, governments choosing environmental policy
have to take into account these sector speciﬁc damages. This is especially important
whenopeneconomiesareconsidered, andservicesproducedbytheenvironmentally
harmed sectors are traded in the world market.
In a world where most countries have signed free trade agreements, there are
restrictions on direct support through trade policies such as export subsidies and
tariffs to support domestic industries. Thus, environmental policy has emerged as
an alternative way to channel this support. There are at least two potential ways
in which environmental policy can be used to support the domestic economy. The
ﬁrst is that large economies can use environmental policies to change terms of trade
in their favor. The second way to support the domestic economy is to make use of
strategic aspects of environmental problems. Given that pollution is a public bad,
the large economy, by a lax environmental policy, may force the foreign economy to
pursue an environmentally conservative policy. This may favor the large economy’s
production sector at the expense of the foreign economy’s production sector.
In the literature on environmental economics, analysis has primarily focused
on whether or not environmental policy in a free trade regime will deteriorate the
quality of the environment. Markusen (1975) and Raucher (1991) show that a large
economyexportingpollutedgoodsshouldhaveanenvironmentallyprotectivepolicy
to affect terms of trade in its own favor, while a large economy importing polluted
goods should have lax environmentally policy to affect terms of trade to its own fa-
vor. Kennedy (1994); Barrett (1994); Ulph (1996) and Tanguay (2001) show that in
a free trade regime countries with market power have strategic incentives to choose
lax environmental policy. However, these results do not hold in general. Rausher
(1994) and Benarroch and Thille (2001) show that general equilibrium effects in
factor market may change these results. Furthermore, Copeland and Taylor (2005)
show that the emission levels in a general equilibrium model with trade may be
strategic complements, which implies that a lax environmental policy in one coun-
try induces lax environmental policy in other countries. In this case, the rationale
for a strategically lax environmental policy is not longer valid. Thus, in general
neither the terms of trade argument nor the strategic behavior argument support the
hypothesis of lax environmental policy in a free trade regime.5 However, Rausher
(1994) and Benarroch and Thille (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2005) give little
attention to the conditions when the terms of trade or strategic behaviors improve or
deteriorate the quality of the environment.
In this paper environmental policy is analyzed in a two-goods, two-country gen-
5There are also other arguments against lax environmental policies. See for instance Greaker (2003)
for a recent contribution and Ulph (1997/1998) for a summary of the literature.
20eral equilibrium model. There are two types of traded goods: eco-services and
conventional goods. The production of the conventional good generates emissions
that damage eco-services. Increasing exposure of emissions decreases the amount
of services that the ecosystem can deliver, at an increasing rate, as the biodiversity
falls and the amount of various species in the system decreases. Furthermore, it
is assumed that eco-services are traded goods.6 Given consumer choices of con-
ventional goods and eco-services the social planner in each country maximizes a
representative individual’s indirect utility function with respect to environmental
policy. The problem is solved for the cases of a benchmark small open economy, a
small regional economy and large economy.
It is shown that environmental policy is more complex than what is portrayed
in the literature. In the large economy case, rent seeking behaviors may result in
increased or decreased domestic emission levels compared to the small economy
case. The change in domestic emission levels depends on how eco-services are
valued relative to conventional goods in the world market and whether the large
economy is an importer or exporter of eco-services. The effects on total emission
levels in the world will be moderate if, as in most cases, one country increases its
emission levels when the other decreases its emission levels. However, for some
range of the relative price, there are cases when both countries increase or both
countriesdecrease emissionlevels. Itisalsoofinterestthatthegreaterthedifference
in the productivity of emissions the greater the range of the price when emission
levels in both countries go in the same direction.
In the small regional case, it is shown that an exogenous price shock induces the
country with higher marginal productivity in eco-services to choose emission levels
that occur together with more production of the good whose relative market value
has increased. However, the other country must also take into account that its gains
from free riding change and it therefore faces a trade-off between these two effects,
and may increase or decrease its emission levels.
In this paper we show that the strategic incentives of countries, when involved
in trade may be more intricate than the earlier literature has indicated. The main
reason for our result is that this paper speciﬁes environmental damages as sector
speciﬁc rather than as a general disutility to consumers.
6 Article IV—Transboundary Pollution
This paper is built up around two observations about international environmental
problems. The ﬁrst is that often relatively wealthy countries give ﬁnancial support
to improvement of environmental quality in less wealthy countries when the envi-
ronmental problem is international. For instance, a substantial proportion of abate-
ments in low income countries in global environmental problems are ﬁnanced by
high income countries through multilateral funds. In addition to this, high income
countries do bilaterally ﬁnance abatements in low income countries. One such case
is Sweden, through environmental aid, ﬁnancing abatements of nutrients loads to
6Ecosystem services may also be non-traded goods but these are not considered in this paper.
21moderate eutrophication in the Baltic Sea. In most of the literature on international
environmental problems it is assumed that countries are sovereign. This implies
that the behavior of Sweden in the Baltic region and that of high income countries
in low income countries are interpreted as altruistic behaviours. However, Hassler
(2002), by studying how Swedish environmental aid is allocated in the Baltic states,
showed that Sweden acts in self-interest. In this paper the sovereignty assumption
is reinterpreted such that countries can act in other’s territories as long as no harm is
done to the host country, i.e. in this model unilateral abatements abroad are allowed.
The second observation is that environmental problems often are characterized
by asymmetries, as discussed earlier. A common explanation for the difference in
interests between high income and low income countries is that the demand for en-
vironmental quality is income related. Often environmental quality is assumed to
be a luxury good and thereby high incomes countries’ demand of environmental
quality is higher than the demand in low income countries. This may explain why
high income countries invest in the environmental sectors of low income countries.
However, empirical evidence seems to suggest that environmental quality is a nor-
mal good which then questions the rationale for high income countries to ﬁnance
abatements in low income countries. In this paper asymmetries in environmental
problems are a further explanation for the behavior of high income countries. This
is particularly evident in the case of eutrophication of the the Baltic Sea where Swe-
den, due to asymmetries in eutrophication, seems to be one of the most affected
counties while Poland and the Baltic states are among those affected the least.
It seems that Sweden unilaterally abates in the Baltic regions and that high in-
come countries often unilaterally abate in low income countries. In this paper it is
investigated whether asymmetries in how pollution hits different geographical areas
may explain these behaviors.
Unilateralimprovementofenvironmentalqualitymaybeineffective. Hoel(1991)
and Buchholtz et al. (1998) have shown that if some countries or coalitions of coun-
tries take unilateral abatements other countries will free ride and decrease their
abatements. Hoel (1992) shows that unilateral abatements may even increase total
pollution levels. Heal (1993) shows that a unilateral abatement, caused by technol-
ogy improvement, may decrease total pollution due to technology spill over effects.
Unfortunately the free riding problem is true for unilateral abatements abroad as
well. Therefore, unless there are technology spill over effects, these abatements may
not improve environmental quality or the improvements are less than predicted.
However there may be conditions when unilateral abatements abroad may give
the desired improvement in environmental quality. In particular if the asymmetries
are the motives for the disinterests of some economies in some environmental prob-
lems it may be permanent.
If countries where abatement takes place are not concerned about the trans-
boudary environmental problems and choose not to take any abatements at all then
the problem is a concern of other environmentally more concerned countries alone.
First the environmentally less concerned country are modelled. It is shown that if
the asymmetries are high enough and the productivity parameter is low this country
may end up in a corner solution where no abatement is undertaken. Given such
22behavior, pollution generated in the environmentally less concerned country is a
problem only to the environmentally more concerned country. Therefore, allowing
the latter to abate abroad, its chooses abatement at home as well and abatement
abroad. The optimal level of abatement abroad is found where marginal loss of util-
ity from refraining from consumption is equal to the marginal value of decreasing
transboundary emissions. In optimum the marginal decrease in transboundary pol-
lution is inversely proportional to the marginal decrease in domestic productivity of
emission. Thus if the productivity of emission at home is high a country is more
willing to substitute domestic abatement with abatements aborad. Furthermore, it is
found that there is a unique saddle point equilibrium. It is also shown that the equi-
librium with countries allowed to abate abroad does not qualitatively differ from
an equilibrium with no such possibilities. However, the equilibrium stock pollution
decreases when the sovereignty assumption is less strictly interpreted.
7 ArticleV—IsPopulationGrowthGoodforthe
Environment.
In this paper we start from the observation that population growth may have positive
aswellnegativeeffectsintheenvironment. Ontheonehand, populationgrowthmay
increase the environmental impact as more individuals increase aggregate demand.
This causes a larger throughput of substances from the earth crust and the burden
on our resource bases increases.
Population growth may however have positive effects on the environment. In
the literature of growth it is for instance assumed that population growth stimulate
production as more individuals create more ideas7. For instance in Jones (1995) a
larger population means a larger number of gifted researchers, who produce more
(useful) ideas. The ideas are transformed into innovations that make it possible
to produce more with a given stock of production factors. In economics : it may
contribute to technological progress, which can be beneﬁcial for the environment.
Jones does not include environmental issues in his analysis, but his framework
is easily amended to allow production to be an increasing function of the quantity
of pollution that is allowed as a by-product of ordinary production8. We do this
and obtain a model where some of the technological progress can be used to reduce
the quantity of pollution generated, without reducing output. That is, technological
progress can make production cleaner, and population growth contributes to this
process.9
7A central feature, necessary for sustained growth, is that ideas/knowledge are non-rival, as opposed
to rival production factors, such as capital and labor.
8Population growth is often ignored in the literature on environment and economic growth. Two
interesting exceptions are however Keeler et al. (1972) and Gradus and Smulders (1993). However, they
only include the negative effect of population growth.
9The literature on growth and pollution has of course used related models before (see Xepapadeas
(2003) for a survey) but not, as far as we know, to analyze the problem we address in this paper. However,
Dasgupta (2003) contains a brief informal discussion of the two roles of population growth that we
analyze here.
23Consequently, we have a model in which population growth has both negative
and positive effects on the environment.10 We derive and analyze a condition for
when the positive effect is dominating. To simplify the exposition, we study the
solution of the benevolent social planner’s problem. We end this note by pointing
out the limitations of the simpliﬁed model analyzed here, and suggest directions for
further research.
8 Conclusions
The general message of this thesis is that when we think of environmental prob-
lems we often neglect the way these problems are transformed into damages. This
is probably because there is a consensus that environmental quality (degradation of
environmental quality) has public good (bad) characteristic, which is particularly
evident in the theoretical literature of environmental and resource economics. In
this thesis we show that the ways in which pollution is realized into economic dam-
ages has major implications for environmental policy. We focus on two areas of
economics, namely long term growth and international environmental problems.
In a growth model aggregate pollution may be composed of many pollutants
that may affect part or may reach the entire population. Therefore, assuming that
the reach of pollution is limited, it is shown that productivity of pollution may be a
determinant of the optimal steady state growth rate. The contribution of this factor
decreases with population density. The higher the population density the higher is
the reach of pollution and the more public pollution tends to be. Thus, it is shown
that sustainable growth is easier to achieve if we acknowledge that the reach of
pollution may be limited.
In international environmental problems, environmental policy is more complex
if individuals can protect themselves from pollution. Self-protection decreases do-
mestic damages for a given level of pollution and may be a substitute for abatement.
An agent can, through self-protection, decreases her own abatement and induce
other agents to increase their abatements. The agent has strategic gains because
costs of abatement are private and beneﬁts of abatements may be public. A second
reason for the complexity of designing policy in international environmental prob-
lems is that environmental damages may be rivals. In such cases, environmental
policy always harms some sector of the economy and favors other sectors. In this
model the incentives to adopt a lax or strict environmental policy depend on the rela-
tive value of the goods produced in the harmed and beneﬁted sectors and how policy
may change this relative value. Finally, Article IV argues that it may be rational for
some countries to unilaterally abate in a foreign economy if there are asymmetries
in environmental damages and the foreign economy has low productivity.
10In Eriksson and Zehaie (2005) there are elements of the same phenomenon in a one-sector growth
model. However, the mechanisms are easier to understand in the two-sector model that we analyze here.
248.1 Further Research
Based on new or the already existing empirical work it may be interesting to see if it
is possible to ﬁnd some regularity in the way pollution is realized as environmental
damages. Some such research may already be going on but it is not fully incorpo-
rated into the theoretical literature on growth and the environment and the literature
on international environmental problems.
An interesting extension of Article I and V may be to look closer at the pop-
ulation variables. In both articles population density is independent of population
growth. However, it is more realistic to assume that population growth is related
to population density. This way it is possible to capture the negative effects of a
high population growth. An interesting other extension would be to endogenize
population growth.
The articles included in this thesis mainly contain analyses of the social opti-
mum, further interesting information may be gained by solving the models in de-
centralized settings. For instance, mechanism design would be interesting to investi-
gate. In Article II it is suggested that the social planner’s intervention in the market
of self-protection may be Pareto improving. However, using market instruments
such as taxes and subsidies probably would not be effective as agents may still act
strategically, which would favor other instruments such as command and control.
It would be interesting to investigate the choice of self-protection and abatement
in a dynamic model, in particular, in a model of research and development. The
probability that new clean technologies may substitute the exiting technologies may
support a temporary use of self-protection. Self-protection may also be of inter-
est if the pollution is related to a non-renewable resource such as carbon dioxide
emissions are related to oil.
The idea that environmental damages may be private and that environmental
policy may have indirect effects on other sectors of the economy, as in Article III,
may be extended to other areas of environmental theory. It would for instance be
interesting to investigate the choice of dirty and clean technologies. It is also inter-
esting to see how bargaining and cooperation may be affected when environmental
policy has positive as well as negative effects on the domestic economy. An empir-
ical application of the model in Article III would also be interesting. For instance,
the starting point could be to study the relative prices of timber and environmental
policy in Canada and Sweden.
In Article IV the obvious extension is the inclusion of capital in the model.
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